1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION
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5	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,)
6	Plaintiff,) Case No. 1:20CR424
7	vs.)
8	MARGARET COLE,
9	Defendant.)
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13	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS HAD BEFORE THE HONORABLE
14	JUDGE JAMES S. GWIN, JUDGE OF SAID COURT,
15	ON THURSDAY, MAY 19TH, 2022,
16	COMMENCING AT 10:00 O'CLOCK A.M.
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21	Court Reporter: GEORGE J. STAIDUHAR 801 W. SUPERIOR AVE.,
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6	and.
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PROCEEDINGS

THE COURT: We are here today on 20CR-424 United States versus Margaret Cole. The case is here today for sentencing.

In this case, the Court finds the Defendant guilty of Count 11, in which she is charged with conspiring to defraud the United States in violation of 18 United States Code, Section 371.

The Court additionally finds her guilty of Count 13, in which she is charged with having made a false statement to the Polish Central Authority in violation of 42 U.S.C., Section 944.

Ms. Cole, have you received a copy of the presentence report?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: And have you gone through each paragraph of that report with your attorneys?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: After going through the report with your attorneys, do you believe there is any mistakes in the report, or do you raise any objection to any of the report paragraphs?

THE DEFENDANT: No.

THE COURT: And I would note counsel raised

1 certain objections to certain paragraphs, but are there 2 any additional objections to the report? 3 I don't know what your THE DEFENDANT: 4 additional --5 MR. SEARBY: Your Honor, if I might assist, 6 Ms. Cole would incorporate by reference the objections 7 that are made and the points made in her sentencing 8 memorandum, which was filed under seal with the Court and 9 also with the addendum to the PSR, in the addendum to the 10 PSR. If the Court would allow it, counsel would make 11 several points to supplement what's stated there. 12 THE COURT: Have you provided Government 13 counsel with a copy of the supplemental argument? 14 MR. SEARBY: No, your Honor. I believe it 15 is subsumed in the arguments between the parties, and it 16 responds, in part, to certain statements made in the 17 Government's sentencing memorandum and to items filed by 18 the Government at approximately 4:00 p.m. yesterday 19 afternoon. 20 THE COURT: Okay. Well, let's -- the 21 objections that I'm aware of, we will go through them 22 sequentially, and you can make argument, and the 23 Government can respond on those. 24 The first, as much as I can tell, is the

objection to the probation officer's recommendation that

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there be an offense Guideline addition because it involved overseas or sophisticated means, which are two separate acts made by the Government.

Let me press the Government to -- on the second portion of the Government's argument on that and on the sophisticated means with regard to Ms. Cole's conduct, is there any -- what's the best argument you have regarding sophisticated means?

MR. MANNING: Yes, your Honor, I can address that. I will just note primarily that our primary argument --

THE COURT: I understood that.

MR. KRAMER: -- on sophisticated means, the best argument is that the conspiracy was not a garden variety criminal scheme, that among sophisticated means employed by the conspirators were a plan to have Cole and clients change their flights to make sure that they did not cross state lines with the child.

So they would fly directly from Europe into Texas and then handing off the child with the assistance of legal documents notarized to effect the transfer of custody.

And before they even got to that situation, the scheme required the conspirators led by the Defendant Margaret Cole to press her Poland clients to conceal to

Polish authorities that they had this plan in place to carry out an adoption under foreign law, to obtain visas through the U.S. Embassy. So this was a complicated scheme that could only be carried out by an adoption agency and the person that led it.

THE COURT: Help me with understanding:
What's the difference between flying directly to Texas
and/or flying to Utah and putting the child on a plane
from Utah to Texas, how does that become sophisticated?

Is there some immigration or other check that would have been present in Utah that would not otherwise be present in Texas?

MR. MANNING: Had the child crossed state lines within the United States, it would have created additional responsibilities to try to complete the proceedings under Texas state law is our understanding, and your Honor --

THE COURT: If the child had landed in Utah and immediately switched to separate plane to Texas, would there have been any state adoption or state custody proceedings in Utah?

MR. MANNING: Yes. I believe that would have been treated as a different situation because the child would have been relocated, rehomed to Texas.

Broadly speaking, your Honor, we understand this is not

1	the type of sophisticated means that involves multiple
2	levels of shell companies or forgeries. It is not
3	sophisticated means of that nature. Nevertheless, for
4	the reasons we stated we think it applies and the
5	substantial conduct overseas, which is the other prong of
6	that adjustment beyond that
7	THE COURT: Mr. Searby, do you have any
8	argument on the sophisticated means position the
9	Government takes?
10	MR. SEARBY: Briefly, your Honor. Would it
11	be allowable to the Court that I remove my mask?
12	THE COURT: Yes, as long as you keep some
13	distance from everybody.
14	MR. SEARBY: Certainly. The counts of
15	conviction of the Government's indictment is a failure to
16	disclose, a failure to disclose and transfer the child to
17	various Government authorities.
18	Remaining silent is not sophisticated, and
19	we also recited a case involving the rejection by the
20	Court of Appeals of an enhancement for sophisticated
21	means in connection with a tax return, and the rejection
22	by the Court that filing a false tax return amounts to
23	sophisticated means.
24	In the 302 report of interview of the Poland

client, to my recollection, it is clear that the decision

to change flights was a decision made by Poland clients. There may have been an indication from Ms. Parris they should do it, but the Court puts its finger on the illogic of this theory that the child would have crossed state lines, whether they flew to Utah directly or Texas and then Utah.

In addition, I would note for the Court, as to Debra Parris, the sentencing Guideline calculations in Ms. Parris' agreement do not include an enhancement for sophisticated means, so it asks the question are we doing it here?

In fact, Ms. Parris was certainly more involved with the transfer of the child to her own relative. She was present in Texas. My client was not. My client's involvement really ended after she was asked to help by the Poland clients develop options, and she was not involved in the specific travel logistics.

THE COURT: Okay. I am going to find that the sophisticated means provision doesn't apply in this case. You raise objection with regard to the other portion of 2B1.1 with regard to whether or not the -- a substantial part of the fraudulent scheme was committed from outside the United States.

> What's kind of the best argument on that? She is here, but is that particularly

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1 important, the fact that she is here? 2 Wasn't the whole scheme set up to bring a 3 foreign-born child to the United States. Wasn't her role of business centered around the idea of international 4 5 adoptions? 6 MR. SEARBY: Yes, your Honor. This case did 7 involve an international adoption as the Court knows from 8 Poland. However, on this point, when you look at the 9 Government's sentencing memorandum, Ms. Cole and the 10 Government agree that the purpose of the enhancement is 11 where Defendants locate conduct overseas in order to 12 avoid detection. 13 THE COURT: I am not sure -- do you have the 14 Guidelines right in front of you? Take a hook at 15 2B1.1(b)(10). So read along with me. "If" -- and then 16 subparagraph (a), are you with me? 17 MR. SEARBY: Sorry, your Honor. I brought 18 the big one. 19 I believe that's page 84. MR. MANNING: 20 I am with you, your Honor. MR. SEARBY: 21 THE COURT: In subparagraph (a), "the 22 Defendant relocated or participated in relocating a 23 fraudulent scheme to another jurisdiction to evade law

enforcement or regulatory officials," then colon, "a

substantial part of the fraudulent scheme was committed

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1 from outside the United States," colon again or -- so 2 doesn't that suggest that (b) is alternative to (a) and 3 that it is not a requirement that there be -- that there 4 be a joining of the relocation possibility with the 5 substantial part of the scheme being outside the 6 United States? They are alternatives, right, (a), (b), 7 and (C), but you don't need (a) to have an application of 8 (b). 9 MR. SEARBY: Well, your Honor, I would agree 10 with the Court that part (b) indicates that locating an 11 operation overseas --12 THE COURT: But it doesn't say that, it 13 doesn't say "locating." It says a "fraudulent part of 14 the scheme was committed outside the United States." 15 MR. SEARBY: I am reading the example it

MR. SEARBY: I am reading the example it gives.

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For example, "in a telemarketing scheme located in the main office of the scheme in one jurisdiction but locating soliciting operations in another jurisdiction ordinarily indicates sophistication."

THE COURT: Yeah, but -- and let me ask the Government to chime in as well -- I think perhaps you misread the Guideline. Under (b) (10), are there not three alternative independent ways (b) (10) can be

violated or be applicable, one where there is an intentional relocation, a second one where there is a substantial part of the fraudulent scheme committed outside the United States, or three, the offense otherwise involves sophisticated means.

Do you have a position? Am I missing that or --

MR. MANNING: Your Honor, the Government's position is as the Court is reading that correctly.

Exactly as the Court has stated, these are three independent grounds for the enhancement to apply, and the independent ground upon which the Government is relying is the prong in (b), which requires that a substantial part of the scheme be committed from outside the United States.

And the appellate case law that the Government cites the Williams case, the Orno case, all hold that when the Court is evaluating the conduct, it is not merely a conduct of the Defendant but the conduct of the entire conspiracy.

For the reasons we set forth in our submission, as the Court has already put its finger on, not only was a substantial part of the conduct here overseas, the conduct overseas was integral. You couldn't have the scheme without EAC's clients being in

Poland seeking to adopt Polish children, under Polish law, through Polish courts, obtaining visas from the U.S. Embassy in Poland and then for the Defendant Margaret Cole to tell false statements to the Polish Central Authority when they were —

THE COURT: Isn't that what the Williams case says?

MR. SEARBY: Um, your Honor, it does but a couple points:

First of all, I agree with the Court that these are stated in the alternative, but I believe if the Court goes back to the original 1998 Sentencing Commission Guidelines policy statements and official commentary that we cite, that was the original purpose underlying where a substantial amount of the conduct is overseas, but let's talk about really the point whether a substantial amount of the conduct, it is not whether there is conduct overseas; it is whether there is a substantial amount was overseas.

Really, the gravamen of the offense here is what transpires after they leave Poland. In fact, if you read the FBI 302 report of interview of Poland clients, they make it clear they did not have their minds made up until they were flying home.

So the offenses for which Ms. Cole has pled

guilty involve reporting violations. None of the charged Defendants here ever left the United States in connection with this offense. And the only overt act in the indictment that was committed overseas is a reference to an unindicted co-conspirator assisting the Poland clients with obtaining the visa, which they did in Poland. That's the only act.

When you again get into the FBI 302 and take out the lawyer's spin and see what Poland clients said actually happened, it is not clear that there was any specific assistance as to obtaining the visa and clear that the Poland clients who were never charged as being participants in this scheme were wholly responsible for obtaining the visa in Poland, which involved them listing the address to which they intended to travel with the child when they left.

THE COURT: Okay. I will overrule the objection. I think that under 2B1.1(b)(10), there is three alternative ways that the Guideline could play into this, and the second of those is when there is a substantial part of the fraudulent scheme that was committed from outside the United States, and in this case, the whole background of the scheme was to perpetrate a fraud on the Polish authorities and perpetrate a fraud on the United States authorities with

1 regard to the Polish adoption. 2 3 overrule your objection as to that. 4 5 6 7 8

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So I find that (b) (10) applies, and I will

Your second objection, I believe, is -deals with vulnerable victim, two-level increase. What's the best argument on that? I mean, this child -- do you deny that the child herself was a victim?

MR. SEARBY: She certainly was a victim, your Honor, and it is a terrible --

THE COURT: Do you believe she was vulnerable?

MR. SEARBY: Within the definition of the Guidelines, she was vulnerable, and that the Guidelines indicate that age, a child is a vulnerable victim. We are not arguing that.

What we are arguing is that the crime by which she was victimized is not the crime for which my client is here today. And I think that the important point that the Government obscures in its memorandum goes to a legal point, and that's the lack of proximate causation. The Guideline applies where the offense of conviction causes harm to a vulnerable victim.

THE COURT: Well, in this case, did -- do the regulations require an earlier home, basically a certification of the adopting parent?

1 MR. SEARBY: Your Honor, the regulations to 2 adopt a child, if that's the question, would require a 3 home study and for the child to be vetted. 4 THE COURT: Was there any home study done of 5 the Parris location? 6 MR. SEARBY: Yes, your Honor, and this is 7 exactly where I was headed. There is a significant 8 intervening event, and that is before the crime is 9 committed against the child in the United States. The 10 Parris relatives are vetted by the state. 11 THE COURT: And that's part of the fraud 12 scheme. They get the adoption in February of '16, 13 right? 14 MR. SEARBY: Well, your Honor, I don't agree 15 that it is a fraud. I think to the issue of this 16 enhancement --17 THE COURT: Didn't your client basically 18 represent Poland and to the United States that -- she 19 failed to indicate to them that the adoption had taken 20 place before they communicated with her. 21 MR. SEARBY: I believe it was the opposite, 22 your Honor, that she reported the dissolution of the 23 foreign adoption, and she reported to the COA, the 24 Council on Accreditation, that the adoption was in 25 process when I believe the adoption was already final

under state law.

But the point I want to go to, which is not in the Government's memorandum and there are statements in the Government's memorandum that become misleading to the Court when this fact is admitted is the fact that the crime occurred after the Parris relatives had a home study, were vetted by the state, and were approved to adopt the child under state law, and it is after that point in August of 2016 when the crime against the child occurred.

So we can ask ourselves if the crime had not occurred in August, but the Parris relative father three years later was driving drunk, and the child was injured, would my client still be responsible as, you know, for harm to a vulnerable victim, and I think the answer is no, and the answer is still no in August '16 because there is a significant intervening event.

THE COURT: Is the Texas juvenile court, if Texas is going to approve the placement with the Parris family, does that end any violation of failing to report to the Polish authorities where the child was actually going to go just simply because some state court makes a decision that it is okay to place with the Parris family?

MR. SEARBY: I don't think it does, and the

issue of reporting violations, in fact, my client has pled guilty to a reporting violation, which occurred after the adoption was finalized. But this particular enhancement is focused on the crime of conviction causing harm to the child, and the Government's theory of the case was that because the child was transferred without being vetted the harm occurred.

The other fact I would want the Court to know is that in July of 2015 when the child was transferred to the Parris relatives at the airport in Texas, at that point, EAC as far as my client knew had ordered a home study on the Parris relatives. As rightly pointed out in the PSR, that home study was delayed at the advice of counsel, but that's true, the full situation that occurred.

THE COURT: On this vulnerable victim, does the Government have an argument on that?

MR. MANNING: Can you repeat the question, your Honor?

THE COURT: On the vulnerable victim, it sounds like counsel for Ms. Cole is arguing that she couldn't have been a vulnerable victim. The state of Texas otherwise approved the placement with the Parris family.

MR. MANNING: Yes, your Honor. It is the

Government's position that the actions of the state of
Texas in February 2016 are essentially irrelevant to
Ms. Cole's culpability to the charged crimes and

irrelevant to the application of this enhancement.

We believe the enhancement applies because in the Government's view the gravamen of this conduct is the conspiracy led by Margaret Cole and her co-conspirators in July of 2015 to direct their client to transfer a vulnerable Polish orphan into a home that was completely unvetted and, therefore, was dangerous, which Cole knew, and the child would never have been placed in the home if not for the direction of Cole as your Honor put its finger on.

There was no home study done at the time. Poland clients had even sent an e-mail to Margaret Cole while they were still in Poland saying, has this family done their home study, to which Margaret Cole never responded.

She caused the child to be placed into that home. If there had been a home study, it would have uncovered that one of the parents had a domestic violence record. If the Polish authorities knew that information, the Polish authorities, it is our understanding, would not have allowed that child to go into that home.

And the Polish authorities also would not

1 have allowed the child to be split from the child's 2 sibling, and the Polish authorities describe that in 3 detail in their victim statement to the Court. 4 And so but for Margaret Cole's conduct, the 5 child never goes in the home. The fact that Texas in 6 February of 2016 thought this was okay does not change 7 the fact that Cole is a responsible place in a dangerous 8 home and worked out tragically as we know. 9 For those reasons, we believe the 10 enhancement applies. 11 Thank you. 12 MR. SEARBY: Your Honor, may I quickly 13 respond to one point? 14 THE COURT: In the FBI report doesn't the 15 Utah couple, aren't they quite clear that they assumed or 16 been led to believe that the Texas couple, the 17 Parris couple had already received approval for the 18 adoption? 19 Your Honor, my recollection is MR. SEARBY: 20 they weren't clear on that point, whether they had an 21 understanding of home study, but I am going by memory, 22 your Honor. I do want to respond to my colleague's point 23 though; 24 That Ms. Cole caused the child to be placed

with the Texas family, and I think it is important to

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remember, first of all, they were given a list of options.

Second of all --

THE COURT: The list of options, your client had a number of other adopting families that were in Poland at the same time, right?

MR. SEARBY: I believe there were other families.

THE COURT: And almost from the get-go hadn't they expressed a desire for a child that was one to two years of age? And hadn't they also, when they got to Poland and had the emotional trouble with the older daughter, hadn't they asked several times whether it might be possible to just adopt one?

MR. SEARBY: Your Honor, they talked about all options. I think one point that is important and it is clear, the Court read the FBI 302 and on behalf of Ms. Cole, I am appreciative of that fact because I think it puts the offense in conduct, but the Poland clients were very clear that they were not going to leave the child in Poland, and as of —

THE COURT: That's because your Poland agent told them the child would never be adopted, that the child would get a red mark against the Parris, and that they would spend the rest of their life in an orphanage.

MR. SEARBY: I think they were influenced by those comments, but if you read the FBI report of interview, they describe concerns for the condition of the children in foster care in Poland.

In any event, this came to Ms. Cole late, and at the point they came to Ms. Cole, there were approximately 48 hours between when Ms. Cole responded and first spoke to the mother of Poland client.

And when they became the parents under Polish and U.S. law, and they did not cause -- my client did not cause the child to be placed there. They were given options, and in the FBI report of interview, they make it clear that they believe that Ms. Cole was acting in good faith; that she was trying to help, and she did not unduly influence them, that it was Ms. Parris they believe two years after the fact who was responsible for that.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, I am going to overrule the objection. I do think the child was a vulnerable victim.

I do think -- first of all, a victim of the offense under the Sixth Circuit Webster decision. And I do think it is fairly obvious the child was vulnerable as well. So I will overrule the objection as to those two levels.

I think the next objection is to 3B1.3, and the application of the abuse of position of trust. In this case, what's the Government's best argument on that?

She to some degree was licensed or certified to run an adoption agency. Is that enough to put somebody in a position of trust?

MR. MANNING: Your Honor, that's one of the factors that we point to. The Government's -- the Government would believe the two best arguments for why the abuse of trust enhancement applies, first off, central to the scheme is the fact that EAC was licensed and accredited to carry out adoptions in Poland.

And the letter from the Polish Central
Authority to this Court makes clear that when the Polish
Central Authority licenses a U.S. agency to coordinate
adoptions of their own vulnerable orphans, that they
trust that the U.S. agency will follow the applicable
rules and will disclose to the Polish Central Authority
that they are following the rules.

They put their trust in EAC and in Cole to do that, and the EAC led by Margaret Cole abused that trust by concealing from Polish authorities this plan to split two siblings, and the Polish Central Authority, their witness Mr. Pedgorski, at the trial would have made

1 clear --

THE COURT: That's true to some degree in all fraud cases.

Is the cornerstone of the position of trust whether the position is one that inherently has discretion?

MR. MANNING: Yes. The comments to 3B1.3 emphasize the importance of an employee who has discretion and, therefore, is not subject to oversight.

THE COURT: In this case, Poland may have relied upon the agency to do an honest report, but I am not sure how an abuse of a position of trust, it seems abuse that the discretion is not inherent in the giving of a false statement.

MR. MANNING: Well, your Honor, we have two arguments in response to that. One, Margaret Cole was the executive director of the agency, and so the way we read that language about people who have positions that are subject to discretion, not subject to oversight, there was no one at EAC who could stop her once she put together this plan.

And the Sixth Circuit's language in Freeman is instructive where the Sixth Circuit in Freeman says the essence of an abuse of trust is when you have a victim who is the sort of having less knowledge and has

to turn to someone who by virtue of their position the victim trusts and places their trust into that person to sort of guide them to do the right thing.

Here the Poland clients had the situation where they were in Poland, and they realized they might not be able to raise these two kids, and they turn to Margaret Cole as the executive director of the agency and trust her to lead them to a solution that with all of her experience and expertise would be safe and ethical and legal.

THE COURT: I am not sure you are not conflating the fact that there may have been, you know, a fraudulent — a reliance upon fraudulent conduct and conflating that with the whole issue of: Were they given particular discretion?

In this case, the two parents apparently had kept some discretion themselves as to whether they were going to turn the child over in the final transition. So how could they have been relying upon — and they had been given these three options. Two of them seemed to be fairly obviously not workable.

How was Cole given the discretion to make the final decision?

MR. MANNING: Cole has the discretion to guide her clients how to resolve the situation and that

the clients trusted her. If they are going to give options, the clients trust those options are legal and safe, and it is Cole who has decades of experience in this field that she has touted and bringing her clients into her business. The clients are in Poland. They have never done an adoption before, and so they turn to her and place their trust in her, and when she is given options, she has the reasonable expectation that the options will be legal, that the options will be appropriate, and Cole abused that, and Cole made a choice to give an option that included, you know, this illegal scheme.

THE COURT: Do you have any response on that?

MR. SEARBY: Your Honor, to the extent the Government is now trying to argue that Ms. Cole abused a position of trust with the clients, the clients don't believe that.

Again, if you go to the FBI 302 and see what they are saying two years after the fact, they are saying take Ms. Cole was a good person and, quote unquote, trying to help. So they don't believe she abused a position.

THE COURT: I am not sure that's the center of the decision on the position of trust, you know,

whether the duped party appreciates that they were duped. Isn't it more a question as to whether Cole by regulation or statute was otherwise put in a position where the certifying agency had relied upon her discretion.

MR. SEARBY: Well, as the Government said, the question goes to really whether they are subject to oversight.

The classic abuse of the position of trust is the lawyer is put in as a fiduciary person and as a competent person and steals their money.

EAC was subject to the whole system of international adoptions to significant oversight. Under that system, the Council on Accreditation was appointed to act for the State Department and to conduct audits of the EAC, to conduct physical inspections of their offenses, and then EAC every four years had to go through a reaccreditation process.

I think to the Court's question, to my friend from the Government, if you extend the enhancement this far, then in virtually every case when somebody does business with the Government or interfaces with the Government, a perceived false statement or false statement of conviction would result in the application of this enhancement, and I think it stretches the enhancement way beyond its purpose.

MR. MANNING: May the Government respond to one point? THE COURT: Go ahead. MR. MANNING: With respect to the oversight provided by Pilla, the evidence at trial would have shown that a centerpiece of that oversight is that the executive director as Margaret Cole had to provide a compliance with all the governing regulations, and the evidence would have shown that within that certification, she had done so after she organized the scheme.

And therefore, she was placed in trust to certify to her compliance honestly, and she didn't. She sent in a false certification in a sense.

To the Court's point, COA does not have the resources by every accredited agency in the United States and COA depends on the certifying honestly, and in this case, Ms. Cole abused that trust.

Thank you.

THE COURT: I think to some degree you are correct there, but they rely on them, but I nonetheless am going to sustain the objection. I think the cornerstone of 3B1.3 is really whether a Defendant has been put in a position where significant discretion was given by either regulation or by practice to the Defendant.

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And in this case, you correctly make an argument that the Polish authorities and to some degree the American authorities relied upon her statement.

But I don't think that's the same determination as a determination as to whether the position itself gave her any particular discretion that would justify the 3B1.3 addition. So I will sustain the objection as to that.

The Government had raised -- do you have any other objections?

MR. SEARBY: Your Honor, on behalf of Ms. Cole, we had a further objection to the organizer, leader, manager --

THE COURT: That's correct. So in this, what's the best argument you have with regard to that?

MR. SEARBY: Your Honor, again, I think if you walk through the 302 and you listen to the Poland clients about what actually happened, Ms. Cole didn't organize the conduct here?

In addition, the case law around this enhancement focuses on Ms. Cole managing other individuals, and her involvement was limited. Again, shortly before the adoption being finalized in Poland, Poland clients on their own initiative reached out and asked her for help, and again, they believe Ms. Cole was

trying to help. Ms. Cole was, in fact, a limited participant in what occurred.

The Government has relied on the fact that she was the director of EAC to suggest that this enhancement is appropriate. I think the Sixth Circuit's decision in Camper cited in other sentencing memo is instructive in this regards, and what matters is not that someone is an organizer or a leader in an organization or even in the criminal conduct; what matters is you manage the conduct.

I think we can come back to the Court's word, the discretion here, and a lot of what transpired here was at the discretion of the Poland clients. They were the ones who said they were not going to leave the child in Poland. They were the ones who chose the Parris relatives as the family over the option of other families and also respite care, which was really my client's recommendation.

And I would note, as we do in other sentencing memos, Ms. Cole placed substantial discretion and had limited oversight of what Ms. Parris did. In fact, Ms. Cole gave her power of attorney to do anything in furtherance of the business of the EAC. So for those reasons and those stated in the sentencing memo, we believe the organizer, manager, enhancement is

inappropriate under the facts of this case.

THE COURT: In her discussions with Parris, didn't she tell Parris to get the family to agree that they had only taken the child for temporary holding?

MR. SEARBY: Your Honor, there is the e-mail that the Court has probably seen where Ms. Parris sends an e-mail -- I believe it was Ms. Parris sends an e-mail to that effect to Ms. Cole.

I have no information that e-mail was ever used. But I think it is important that in the trial of the crime against the child committed by the Parris relative, Ms. Parris repeatedly testified under oath that, in fact, the transfer was for respite care.

So that would have been a true statement at the time. In fact, the only legal status — they couldn't say the child was transferred to the adoptive parents because they had no legal status. The only legal status they had at the time of the transfer in 2015 was for temporary care pending either an approval of an adoption, and that may have been their hope and dream, but that was not, in fact, the status in July of 2015 when the child was transferred from Poland clients to the Parris relatives.

THE COURT: But it was never intended to be respite with the idea that the child would go back to the

Utah couple, was it?

MR. SEARBY: Your Honor, if you look at the report written by the social worker, Nancy Wolf attached to our sentencing memo who spoke to Poland client right before they left Poland, the discussion was about temporary respite care.

There are also e-mails between my client and Poland client where they discuss the benefits of respite care. In fact, Poland client says that she is even having cold feet about transferring the child temporarily. So no, I would not say that was never the discussion.

That was, in fact, my client's hope that what would happen was they could return to their home after six weeks in Poland. They could get a break for this child who they reported was extremely difficult, and then, they could make a clear decision about whether they co-parent the child or whether there would be another solution.

THE COURT: Well, Parris though, Parris at your client's direction solicited the e-mail from the recipient couple, right, falsely saying that it was only a temporary guardianship.

MR. SEARBY: Your Honor, my client is unclear on it. Ms. Parris may say she did it at

1	Ms. Cole's suggestion, but I think you have to ask
2	yourself
3	THE COURT: She gave that to your client,
4	and your client then forwarded it on, correct?
5	MR. SEARBY: That's correct, and Ms. Parris
6	testified over and over in a Texas Court that, in fact,
7	the transfer was for respite care.
8	THE COURT: But your client knew that the
9	Parris couple was, you know, they were brought into the
10	play only because of your client, right? Your client
11	said there are three options, a single New York woman, a
12	Utah couple with five or so kids, and the Parris couple
13	which seemed attractive because they had one daughter
14	relatively close in age to the 5 year-old.
15	MR. SEARBY: There was three options, and
16	there was a fourth.
17	THE COURT: Who gave the fourth?
18	MR. SEARBY: As I understand it, it was a
19	foster care situation in Utah.
20	THE COURT: Do you have some response on the
21	manager?
22	MR. MANNING: Yeah. Thank you, your Honor.
23	Briefly, first, the Government is puzzled by
24	the advocacy by the defense here because Ms. Cole pleaded
25	guilty under oath in this Court to Count 11 and Count 13,

both of which at their core had false statements about saying that this was for respite care when Cole knew that it was not at the time the child came out of Poland, we are surprised this issue is being revisited here.

As for the application of the organizer, leader enhancement, this Court is exactly right, this two-point enhancement that we are seeking under the Sixth Circuit law, recruiting someone into the conspiracy or supervising someone under the conspiracy is sufficient for the enhancement to apply.

Here Margaret Cole brought Parris into the conspiracy. Parris otherwise had no contact with the Poland client. She brought her into the conspiracy, recommended that her relatives take this child, coordinated with Parris to direct these false statements.

The e-mail your Honor is referring to is dated December 9th, 2016, and in Debra Parris' guilty plea, she indicated she sent that to Ms. Cole at Cole's direction to falsely stay the detention with respite care.

Two days later Margaret Cole uses that to send the false statement to Polish authorities repeating this falsehood, relying on what she has obtained from Debra Parris. Parris is a salaried EAC employee, and so we also argue that Margaret Cole organized and led

1 co-conspirator 1's participation in this as well who 2 depended on EAC for hundreds of thousands in revenue. 3 And for all these reasons for the manager, 4 the Carter and Rexton precedent in the Sixth Circuit, the 5 organizer enhancement applies here, your Honor. 6 MR. SEARBY: One sentence, your Honor. 7 My client did not manage or supervise the 8 day-to-day activities of the other individuals who were 9 charged. 10 THE COURT: Okay. I am going to overrule 11 the objection to the two-level increase for the 12 organizer, leader. There was other participants. 13 I find that the Defendant really had the 14 decision-making authority, and she was involved with the 15 recruitment of Parris, and there is no indication that 16 she got a larger share of the money, but she did exercise 17 a degree of control that was over Parris and over the 18 others that I think justifies the 3B1.1 increase. 19 I think those are all the objections that I 20 The Government raises one objection as best I 21 understand arguing that medical conditions are not 22 specifically a grounds for a sentencing decision. 23 Do you have anything you want to say on 24 that? 25 MS. RICE: Thank you, your Honor.

speak to that.

In the initial presentence report, there were limited medical records included, and that was simply commenting the Government had not seen more specific records. During the Government's discussion of the 3553(a) factors, we will speak further as to the specific medical conditions identified in the final PSR.

To the extent this is an objection, it is an objection to any variance or departure based on medical condition.

THE COURT: Okay. Medical conditions I find under more recent authority to be something that can be considered. So if that was an objection to that, I will overrule it.

So in this case, I would set the base offense level at 6. I would find there should be a six-level increase under Guideline 2B1.1(b)(10), which would take it to 12.

I find a further two-level increase because I find a vulnerable victim was involved. I give a further two-level increase because I find the Defendant under 3B1.1 that the Defendant was a leader, manager, or supervisor of the criminal activity.

I would decline to give the 3B1.3 increase that is suggested because I find the position of trust is

1 not applicable. That adjustment is not applicable in 2 this case. 3 So I set the adjusted offense level at 16. 4 The Defendant gets two levels off for acceptance of 5 responsibility. The total offense level comes in at 14. 6 The Defendant has no Criminal History points. 7 receives a Criminal History Category I. 8 So having made those findings, does the 9 United States have any argument before sentence is 10 imposed? 11 Thank you, your Honor. May I MS. RICE: 12 approach the podium and speak from the podium? 13 THE COURT: Yes. Let me ask you to hold for 14 just a second. Okay. 15 Do you have any argument? 16 MS. RICE: Thank you, your Honor. Before I 17 begin, there are victims that would like to speak. Would 18 you like to hear from them now or after the Government 19 makes argument? 20 THE COURT: Why don't you ask them to speak 21 before? 22 MS. RICE: Thank you, your Honor. 23 MR. DAVIS: My name is Adam Davis. This is 24 my wife Jessica, my son Isaac. We would thank you, your 25 Honor, for this brief moment today to share with the

Court a little of our experience with Margaret Cole and European Adoption Consultants.

In 2015, our family adopted a child from Uganda through European Adoption Consultants. Upon our return to the United States from Uganda, we reported to EAC many unseemly happenings in Uganda, via European Adoption Consultants, managers, and in-country team.

We requested on multiple occasions to speak with Margaret Cole regarding the bribery, the harassment, the exploitation, the threats, and the coercion that we had witnessed there believing Margaret Cole would be horrified by these happenings within her organization.

None of our phone calls were ever returned by her.

When we learned a year later that the child we adopted was not uneducated, had not been abandoned by a neglectful or indifferent mother and had three times as many siblings as what we were told not to mention a huge extended family that loved our adopted daughter very much, we made the difficult but humane decision, the moral decision to reunite this child with the family and the mother who never intended to surrender her parental rights to her child to begin with.

After our child was returned home to her mother and family, only then did Margaret Cole try and contact us, not to follow-up on the many ethical concerns

we had expressed about her adoption outfit, not to inquire about our welfare or the welfare of our adopted child, Margaret Cole contacted us then to breathe threats and to protect the empire she had built praying upon the poor and exploited the world's most vulnerable children for financial gain. Margaret Cole is EAC, and EAC is Margaret Cole.

She is responsible for this criminal enterprise from top to bottom. The lowest level child finder in our daughter's rural village in Uganda spoke directly to Margaret Cole on the phone when our daughter returned home as our attorney can confirm. She is that intricately involved in her operation.

She cannot plead ignorance to anything when it comes to EAC. Margaret Cole not only swindled our family out of our life savings, trafficking children for adoption, but she was also prepared to slander me to my employer and rob me of my livelihood as well as our child's social worker at the time can attest.

Margaret Cole is guilty. Those willing to exploit the poor and commoditize the children of the poor in pursuit of wealth belong in their own nefarious category of inhumanity. We ask that her sentence today reflect this.

Again, thank you for the time.

THE COURT: Thank you.

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MS. RICE: Thank you, your Honor.

I will reference the additional victim impact statements, which I know your Honor has received and read in a moment. But I wanted to start with, as my colleague referenced, a reminder that I didn't think we would have to go back over the ground of why we are here today.

But Margaret Cole has pled quilty to knowingly and willfully making false statements, to knowingly and voluntarily entering into a conspiracy to defraud the United States.

In her sentencing filings and argument today, there seems to be some backwards ground as to whether she truly is admitting to the conduct here.

The Government is not asking the Court to eliminate the two levels for acceptance of responsibility, but we are a bit perplexed we have to revisit ground we thought we already covered at our plea hearing and plea agreement.

So with that background, your Honor, this is a serious offense. This is not a one-day or a two-day offense. This is not a lapse in judgment. This is conduct that spanned over a year that involved lies to United States authorities, to foreign authorities, and

1 perhaps, most importantly, to couples who were putting 2 their full trust in her with respect to the livelihood of 3 children of orphans. The Defendant has routinely referred to this 4 5 as being a few days and feeling badly that she offered to 6 help the Rumpuses. This was not a technical or 7 administrative violation; this was not a reporting 8 violation. This was making lies to COA, to the Polish 9 Central Authority, and to Rumpuses. 10 THE COURT: What's your theory, if the 11 Rumpus adoption fell through, what's the theory on how 12 that impacts the Defendant? 13 MS. RICE: Thank you, your Honor. 14 testimony at trial would have been from the Polish 15 Central Authority that EAC would have lost their 16 accreditation, and at the time of the Rumpus adoption 17 pending, Poland was 40 percent of the revenue for EAC. 18 THE COURT: Well, let me go back. They 19 go over there. There is some indication they are told 20 it would be just a visit, and they would come back and 21 make a decision not to adopt anyone. Is that the 22 background? 23

THE COURT: Yes, in 2015.

first went to Poland?

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MS. RICE: With respect to when the Rumpuses

1 MS. RICE: So they went to Poland believing 2 they were adopting two sisters. And when they got there, 3 they immediately discovered --4 THE COURT: I thought the representative in 5 Poland had made some statement to them, to the impact 6 that if they got over there and decided they couldn't 7 handle two, that they could just leave without any. 8 MS. RICE: You are referring to 9 co-conspirator 1, your Honor? 10 THE COURT: Yes. 11 So what the final understanding MS. RICE: 12 of the Rumpuses, they could not just take one or be red 13 marked. 14 THE COURT: That's after they get over 15 there. 16 MS. RICE: Correct. You are talking about 17 in proceeding, going through the lengthy process of 18 getting to Poland to adopt? 19 THE COURT: Right. 20 MS. RICE: Yes. They were given a number of 21 adoptions who they could adopt, but initially, they did 22 not want to adopt older children and were told there 23 would be other options, and as your Honor is well aware, 24 when they got to Poland with the two sisters, they -- it

was more than they felt their family could handle, which

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1 brings us here today. 2 I don't know if I answered your question 3 accurately, your Honor. 4 THE COURT: So they get over to Poland. 5 They spend six or seven weeks with the two young 6 girls? 7 MS. RICE: Correct, your Honor. 8 THE COURT: And then, they try to -- they 9 notice some fairly immediate difficulty with regard to 10 the older child, less difficulty with regard to the 11 younger child. 12 MS. RICE: Correct. They noticed difficulty 13 with both, but they found the older one had more severe 14 mental difficulties that would be difficult for them with 15 their three sons and the younger child to provide the 16 adequate care. 17 THE COURT: Aren't they then in a quandary 18 because they obviously have grown to love these two girls 19 and their concern for the two individual girls and had 20 been told that the girls will just be condemned to a life 21 in an orphanages if they don't take them? 22 Aren't they in a quandary where they can't 23 handle two, but they don't want to leave either child 24 there? 25

MS. RICE: That's correct, and I will note

that the 302 that the Court has from several years ago,
we are glad the Court has that, the Rumpuses' interviews,
but to note at that time, the Rumpuses were not shown nor
were they aware of any of the false statements that the
Defendant has admitted to, and there were are later
interviews and testimony given by them.

But one thing they were consistent on throughout, they had been consistent on all of their testimony, they were not leaving either child there because they were told if they left one child in Poland, that child would be red marked, likely left in an orphanage and could potentially die.

THE COURT: Would Poland allow the immigration of a single one of these sisters?

MS. RICE: No. If the Polish authorities had been notified as they should have been, they would not have allowed the siblings to have been split up, and Mr. Pedgorski would have testified to that at trial and speaks to that in his impact statement.

THE COURT: So they are in a position where it is either all or nothing, right?

MS. RICE: Correct, your Honor, and while they realize they could not care for both children, they, of course, wanted nothing but the best for them. And that's why based on the representations from the

Defendant the Tufts family was so appealing. They
believed this was a family that could give the adequate
care and attention to the older child that she needed.
They cared for her very much as evidenced by the fact
that after she was horrifically abused, they spent years

But yes, your Honor, they certainly at the forefront of their mind was ensuring that both children were cared for and placed in a home where they would be safe, which speaking to the Defendant's role here, your Honor, she communicated with them.

of their life and expense to get her back to her family.

They trusted her. They called her up, and as the 302 and e-mails show, they were in a very emotionally charged, very trying situation, and they turned to her and her thousand adoptions, years of expertise to do and guide them in what is legal.

She had multiple opportunities. It was referenced earlier that this all happened within 48 hours. Forty eight hours was more than enough time to notify the Polish authorities that a family in Poland will not be taking both children to their home. Forty eight hours, if it is even 48 hours — the Government submits it was much longer than that — that is sufficient time to notify COA.

That is sufficient time to tell the truth.

The Defendant chose not to and instead facilitated and led this conspiracy to have the child transferred to a family that had no vetting, had no background check, and the Defendant in her years of experience, decades of doing intercountry adoption is well aware of the requirements for background checks and vetting, and indeed, when the Rumpuses asked has this family had a home study, there was no response.

There also has been reference to and various filings, this being a black swan event and this never happening before. Well, one of the counts to which the Defendant has pled guilty and admitted conducting committing is knowingly and willfully making a false statement. And the Defendant is well aware the need to tell the truth.

This is certainly not the first time. There have been reports required to COA or to foreign countries. So this is not a black swan event when it comes to telling the truth and being honest.

And here what is really telling, your Honor, and speaks to the Defendant's intent at the time of the original transfer of the children to the Tufts family is that months and months go by where she knows they have not been vetted, where the Polish authorities have not been notified, where COA has not been notified, and she

does nothing.

She tells no one, and when it comes time for the six-month post-placement, as she is well aware in every intercountry adoption are required from the family, there is no post-placement report for the child with the Tufts family.

One is submitted late and is not at all in line with the appropriate requirements of post-placement report. Yet, no disclosure is made at the time. The first disclosure, as your Honor is aware, April 2016, and that one contains false statements, lies, misrepresentations.

Now, your Honor, in the sentencing memorandum for the defense, there is a reference that this was not submitted by Margaret Cole. In the Government's supplemental exhibits and as testified to at trial, the only other employer whose name is identified there on the 2016 report, she would not have submitted anything to COA without the direction and authority of Margaret Cole. So whether or not she pressed "send," she caused the information to be made and false statements to be made.

With respect to the August 2016, false statement to COA, your Honor, several things speak volumes with respect to that.

First of all, it starts out by saying "we are not being investigated," again highlighting what was at the forefront of the Defendant's mind at the time; was not the injuries that had been sustained by this orphan but what was happening to her agency.

This is also referenced in the 302 report of the Utah family where they said when they spoke to the Defendant after learning what happened to the older child. She said this is going to ruin my agency." And indeed, at that point, as the Government has provided exhibits and highlighted and elicited at trial, Poland was more than 40 percent of the revenue for her business.

Accreditation was pending in foreign countries, in that country and other countries, and it, indeed, would have a significant effect on her business. But instead of being honest at that point, she continued to lie. She claimed the date of incident was August 30th of 2016 when, in fact, she had been notified weeks earlier, and this is significant because an injury like this must be reported within 48 hours.

She deliberately indicated the date as being within the 48-hour reporting requirement. This was not a technical or accidental mistake as she has admitted under oath; this was knowingly and willfully done intending that the fraudulent statement would influence COA and the

Polish authorities.

And the December 2016 letter to the Polish authorities, your Honor, in her sentencing filings, she references this was drafted by an attorney, and it may have been drafted in consultation with an attorney, but certainly, Margaret Cole had significant involvement, and her attorney would only know what to write based on the information she shared.

Indeed, in Government's Exhibit J there is an e-mail communication chain between her and her attorney, and what her attorney says "you must read all of it to be sure it says what we want," followed again by inquiring "did they have an approved home study?"

So acknowledging the importance of the home study and the fact it was not done. Following that the Defendant and her co-conspirator exchange e-mails in which the Defendant says to her with respect to the letter "let's do it ourselves. I will send you what I wrote for the training part."

So despite her efforts to minimize her involvement in this lengthy letter and repeated false statements, she was directly involved and deliberate and was given to the Polish authorities.

As referenced earlier by my colleague, intercountry adoption is a system based on trust. COA

has to rely on the integrity of the agencies and directors like Margaret the Cole. Certainly, the authorities, as Mr. Pedgorski detailed in his statement, rely on the trust and integrity and trust of people like Margaret Cole.

When it is abused, there are far-reaching damage as has been evidenced here. The victims, as your Honor highlighted, include the older child who, while it is fortunate that the Utah family fought to have her back in her family and they are working everyday to make sure she has a good life, she will never recover from what she suffered.

The Utah family themselves, as detailed in their victim impact statement, feel betrayed, have lost trust. It has permanently -- hopefully not permanently -- but severely damaged their entire family.

The other families that were pending adoption in Poland at the time that Margaret Cole led this conspiracy, they are also victims. They as outlined in the statement from Mr. Pedgorski and the State Department, they either were delayed in their adoptions or could not adopt any children at all.

And certainly, international relations were affected as detailed by the State Department and Mr. Pedgorski in his statement.

Now, this was not with respect to the 3553(a) factors, and the nature and characteristics of the Defendant, certainly, the Government acknowledges she has done good things in her life.

There are families here she has created because of her work and adoption. The Government does not dispute that, and all of the people that wrote letters during the time in the Russia program, the Government does not dispute that those are good acts she has done.

But of note, all of those letters in support are from up through the mid 2000s. After the Russia program closed, things changed at EAC. That was a large basis of revenue for EAC, and it was not until the Poland program that there were European countries that EAC felt they could do adoption with, and that is why the Poland program was so important for EAC and the motivation for this year-long deceit and fraud.

With respect to the Defendant's background and characteristics, your Honor, she is educated. She attended a year of law school. Certainly, as I referenced, she has done some good acts, but that does not eliminate or avoid the seriousness and extent of the harm done here.

With respect to her medical conditions, your

Honor, the Government submits that they all can be treated in the Bureau of Prisons. There is nothing, at least based on the limited amount of medical records the Government received, that cannot be treated in custody.

There was reference to ongoing screenings, medications, and certainly other cases in this Circuit, in this District, including the Barro case, have individuals that have similar conditions that have received custodial sentences.

With respect to COVID and the argument that she would be eligible for compassionate release, all of the cases cited by Defendant were prevaccination, and courts have routinely denied extraordinary and compelling reasons for compassionate release when the Defendant has been vaccinated, and the 3553(a) factors do not warrant it as they do here.

Touching briefly on sentencing disparities, your Honor, as you are well aware, her co-Defendant Robin Longoria, who is certainly less culpable and pled guilty years earlier, received a sentence of 12 months and one day.

THE COURT: Are you familiar with the JSIN?

MS. RICE: I am, your Honor.

THE COURT: And the final offense level of 14 with a Criminal History Category 1, are you familiar

1 with what the median and average sentences are? 2 MS. RICE: I am not for offense level 14, 3 your Honor. I had calculated that based on offense level 4 16, which the Government submitted we believed was the 5 Guidelines calculation. So I can't speak to offense 6 level 14. Certainly, if your Honor has that figure --7 THE COURT: 81 percent of people received 8 imprisonment that came under that Guideline at that 9 offense level and Criminal History Category, and the 10 average length of incarceration was 11 months. 11 median was 12 months. 12 So it appears that the broad majority of 13 people in her Criminal History Category and her offense 14 level received incarceration, and it ranged somewhere 15 around 11 or 12 months. 16 Is there some argument given her age it 17 should be somewhat lower. 18 MS. RICE: No, your Honor, it is not unusual 19 for first time fraud offenders to be older, and 20 certainly, at the time that she --21 THE COURT: Somewhat older than the median 22 age, but it is somewhat unusual at her age, right? 23 MS. RICE: Again, yes. Somewhat older than 24 across all fraud offenses in this District, yes. 25 THE COURT: So relative to -- is there any

real argument for specific deterrence to be a factor? 1 2 MS. RICE: Specific deterrence, your Honor, 3 no. 4 THE COURT: And relative to general 5 deterrence, is that kind of a weak factor? How many 6 people are going to hear about whether I give a longer 7 sentence or shorter sentence? How many people are really 8 going to hear and otherwise be deterred? 9 MS. RICE: Your Honor, I would respectfully 10 The general deterrence is of utmost importance 11 here because -- and I can't state it better than Ms. King 12 from the Department of State said -- "countries in 13 international organizations around the world have taken 14 note of Ms. Cole's actions and how she has exploited the 15 intercountry adoption for her own personal gain." 16 General deterrence is important in all white 17 collar cases and fraud cases and absolutely is important 18 Intercountry adoption is a system based on trust, 19 and as the Defendant has referenced, the statute she pled 20 quilty to has not had a conviction before. 21

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So highlighting that this type of conduct in years of lies and false statements to foreign and U.S. authorities will not be stood for. So respectfully, your Honor, the Government submits general deterrence is very important in this case.

1 And with respect to the sentencing 2 disparities, your Honor, just briefly, thank you for 3 those numbers, certainly, the Government believes that 4 there is no basis to disparity or varying from the 5 Guidelines or from these average and median sentences nor 6 from the sentence of her co-conspirator. It is not 7 unusual for first-time offenders to not have a criminal 8 record. Indeed, in 2020 71.8 percent convictions --9 THE COURT: That's almost given. I think 10 the statement was it is not unusual for first-time 11 offenders not to have a record. 12 MS. RICE: I'm sorry, your Honor. 13 individuals convicted under 2B1.1 to be first time 14 offenders is what I meant to say. 15 THE COURT: Okay. 16 MS. RICE: And the statistic was that 71.8 17 percent of individuals sentenced under the fraud 18 provision 2B1.1 were first-time offenders. 19 So the fact that she is not -- does not have 20 a Criminal History does not place her in an unusual 21 situation for a fraud offense. 22 Finally, with respect to 28 U.S.C., Section 23 994(j), which the defense references multiple times in 24 their sentencing memorandum, the Sixth Circuit has 25 repeatedly said that's a directive to the Sentencing

Commission, not to the judicial officers.

Indeed, the Guidelines were created
substantially, in part, to address disparities in white
collar offenses.

THE COURT: Let me ask you, generally with
Bl.1, she ends up at a 14 with a Criminal History
Category I. Because of the way 2Bl.1 operates, wouldn't

B1.1, she ends up at a 14 with a Criminal History

Category I. Because of the way 2B1.1 operates, wouldn't

most of the people that end up at 14, Criminal History

Category I, wouldn't most of them be kind of larger

dollar volume fraud Defendants where the conduct may well

have involved significantly more money than this case?

MS. RICE: That may or may not be the case, depending on the enhancements. Certainly, that could be the case where there was lower dollar amount, and there were a number of victims or there were sophisticated means, so not necessarily, your Honor.

I don't think that only because it is under B1.1 means that there is significant dollar loss here, but the Government is not disputing the dollar loss here; that there is no dollar loss.

However, the damage and the seriousness of this offense cannot be measured in dollars.

THE COURT: Are you seeking any restitution?

MS. RICE: No, your Honor. The victims

haven't requested restitution, and it is the Government's

1 position that those figures would be too difficult or 2 complex to calculate. We concur that any harm suffered by the older child would be too difficult to calculate 3 4 any restitution. 5 So no, your Honor, we are not seeking 6 restitution from Margaret Cole. 7 There were requests made from victims 8 related to the relevant conduct in the Uganda scheme, but 9 the Government is cognizant that she has not been 10 convicted of those. While they are relevant and speak to 11 her character and the Court may consider all relevant 12 conduct for sentencing, we are not seeking restitution. 13 THE COURT: Okay. Let me give counsel for 14 the defense an opportunity to make argument. 15 MS. RICE: Thank you, your Honor. 16 And I would just reference again the victim 17 impact statements from all of the victims, including the 18 State Department and Mr. Pedgorski from Polish Central 19 Authority. 20 Thank you. 21 MR. SEARBY: Your Honor, we would also ask 22 to have the opportunity to have several individuals 23 address the Court at this time. 24 THE COURT: Pick two that you want. 25 MR. SEARBY: Your Honor, I am going to have

1 a tough time when I walk out of here talking to the third 2 one. 3 THE COURT: Flip a coin. 4 MR. SEARBY: All right. We will start, your 5 Honor, with Alex Rokakis. 6 MR. ROKAKIS: Good morning, your Honor. 7 I remove my mask? 8 THE COURT: Yes. 9 MR. ROKAKIS: Thank you. 10 My name is Alex Rokakis. I will be brief, 11 your Honor, as I have expressed my thoughts and my letter 12 to the Court earlier this month. You have hundreds of 13 pages from this file, including letters of support for 14 Margaret Cole and letters from victims and testimony 15 today from a victim. 16 Perhaps it is inappropriate for me, a 17 33-year former member of the Office of the U.S. Attorney 18 and a person who has not seen the entire file, to 19 advocate for leniency for Margaret Cole, but regardless 20 here I am today to speak on her behalf and arque for 21 leniency. 22 In the United States, we don't have 23 orphanages anymore, your Honor; we have foster homes. 24 no longer have orphanages. They have long fallen by the 25

wayside. We have these foster homes where children

1 without parents are cared for.

> But I have been to orphanages in Moscow where you walk in the door where the children are clothed and fed but not loved. You walk in the door, and they run up, and they throw their arms around you because, they want you to take them home and become their mama and or their papa.

> I have seen these children, and I have adopted two of them. I know what good Margaret Cole has accomplished. Over 8,000 lives have been changed for the better; 8,000 adults that would have grown up unloved and turned out into the streets to fend for themselves.

> My own son might have been conscripted into the Russian Army and been forced to fight in the Ukraine. Margaret Cole may have lost her adoption agency, but she has the eternal gratitude of thousands of people like myself who are forever in her debt.

> Since a search warrant was executed on her home and business and she was indicted five years ago, she has suffered greatly. I pray that the good she has done outweighs the mistake she made on this one adoption, your Honor, and you take that into consideration.

> > Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. SEARBY: Mr. Mack?

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MR. MACK: Good morning, your Honor. My name is Dave Mack. I am from Chicago. I and my wife adopted three children at different times, through EAC and with the help of Margaret Cole, and she changed our lives.

THE COURT: What years?

A JUROR: I'm sorry. What years did we do it? This was in the former Soviet Union, so it was '92 and '94, '92 and '94.

THE COURT: Go on. I just was trying to give context to your comments.

MR. MACK: The former Soviet Union was the place. Our son was an infant, and he was in Penza, Russia. Our middle daughter was two and-a-half, and she was in Kazakhstan, and our third daughter is the one in 1994, is from Moscow, an orphanage in Moscow. She is the one who wrote you a letter about her experience.

She is in South Korea with the U.S. Army as a captain. I am here really to talk about, as Alex did, the accomplishments and the good deeds that Margaret really did. She changed lives with the 8,000 children, and I want to put in order of magnitude on the 8,000 plus children.

It was over a 24 to 25 year period 8,000, slightly less than one child for everyday in that 24, 25

year period. So it was quite a body of work.

My particular children had lots of medical issues. We have been able to deal with those issues, and they are all on their own. They are adults. They are on their own financially, and I would say that the key to this is the children that she has helped, that have gotten adopted ended up in a better place than where they were. That is huge. And I feel -- I feel that should weigh something in the sentencing that you are going to give for Margaret Cole.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Do you have any argument before sentence is imposed?

MR. SEARBY: I do, your Honor.

THE COURT: She will get a chance after you.

MR. SEARBY: Okay. Thank you, your Honor.

Your Honor, may it please the Court, the Court asked the Government questions under the 3553 factors regarding general deterrence. There is no issue of specific deterrence. My client is not a threat to anyone and is no longer involved as a result of the Government's debarment in the adoption industry.

I think as the Court got a flavor during the Daubert hearing, Mr. Berger, I have learned through this case that the world of international adoption is a small

world, and what happened has happened to Ms. Cole is well known throughout that community. And regardless of the sentence the Court imposes, this has become a cautionary tail. And no one wants to go down the road Ms. Cole has been down.

Unfortunately, as you've heard today from two people and we could have brought many, many former clients to talk about what has happened, Ms. Cole's life has been defined by an adoption that went terribly wrong, not the thousands and thousands that went right.

And as I listened hand to the conversation between the Court and the Government and the Court rightly talked about the dilemma faced by the Poland clients and also faced by Ms. Cole, which she stepped into this situation, which was not of her own making, it should also be appreciated that these children in Poland were eligible to be adopted because, as was stated in the documents that were translated from the Polish government.

There were not individuals in Poland, that after six months that were willing to adopt them. It was at that point the Polish government was willing to have them adopted from abroad.

And of course, in the 302 you see the concerns for the condition of the children on behalf of

the Poland clients, which influenced their position, which was steadfast, that they were unwilling to leave the children in Poland. And that was really one thing they were certain about.

The government talked about in that 48 hours the Polish government could have been contacted. Yes, they could have been contacted, but the problem again, borne out by the FBI 302, the parents had made their decision.

In fact, they hadn't made a final decision when they left Poland. They made that decision at Charles DeGaulle Airport. According to what they said at the FBI in the 302 after they had a bad night and they finally decided that they could not parent both children, but during the 48-hour window, whether it is 48 hours, 72 hours that the government talked about, they had not made a final decision and would have been inappropriate of my client at that point to notify the Polish government.

Ms. Cole did not get involved in the events that lead her to be before the Court today to commit a crime. She became involved because the Polish clients asked for her help, and again, they believed she acted in good faith.

We accept responsibility that Ms. Cole exercised poor judgment with reporting from those moments

1 forward, and the offense conduct, the stipulated conduct 2 in the plea agreement speaks to that, and we accept that 3 her disclosures to the interested parties were sometimes 4 late. They lacked candor, but there were disclosures, 5 and events were made. 6 THE COURT: Wouldn't she -- wasn't she 7 largely covering herself? 8 MR. SEARBY: I think, your Honor, there was 9 a motive in the end to deflect blame here. 10 THE COURT: I mean, maybe the most 11 unseemingly is you have got this 5 year-old girl who 12 seemingly is brutally raped. Is a 5 year-old that 13 seemingly has gone through a medical examination before 14 she ever leaves Poland. 15 And this child is to some degree torn apart. 16 And your client's first reaction is to basically claim it 17 must have happened in Poland at a time when the nurse 18 that examined the child obviously said no way, shape, 19 form. Was this something that happened before? 20 Your client did that two or three times, 21 basically blaming it on some rape in Poland and rather 22 than accepting the fact that Parris had done it. 23 MR. SEARBY: The Parris relatives. 24 THE COURT: The Parris relatives in Texas. 25

MR. SEARBY: Right. And I understand the

1 Court's concern, but let's put it in context; that in the 2 disclosures where my client obviously placed an emphasis 3 on the evidence of potential prior abuse in Poland, not 4 in Texas --5 THE COURT: What evidence was that? You 6 know, I looked, and the child's statement was something 7 to the impact that somebody in Poland had hit her foot. 8 MR. SEARBY: Yeah. The Poland clients noted 9 the injuries to the foot. That's not what was at issue. 10 What my client did in the disclosures and it is important 11 is with her statement she forwarded the report from the 12 detective in Texas. 13 THE COURT: Yeah, but didn't she to a major 14 degree try to give an explanation that was completely 15 different? 16 I would not say that she MR. SEARBY: No. 17 tried to give an explanation that was completely 18 different. She noted there were new injuries and old and 19 I think at its worst --20 THE COURT: Let me find that because for the 21 life of me I don't remember her saying new injuries. 22 MR. SEARBY: But the point is the document 23 forwarded with her communication was, in fact, the police 24 report from the detective, which talked about the new 25 injuries, which could not have occurred in Poland.

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THE COURT: Right. Absolutely. So why would she bring them up in the letter to both the Polish officials and the letter to the detective?

MR. SEARBY: Well, your Honor, again, I am not trying to excuse the way it was written, but the information was provided from the detective, the full complete report, and Mr. Roberts, in fact, contacted the detective before trial to make sure that that report from the detective was complete and accurate to what the detective prepared.

And that report talks about old injuries and new injuries. You know, the way that the old injuries were emphasized, I understand the Court's strong disagreement with that. And that's why we are here.

But in that very same communication, if someone read the full communication, they would see the information as to the new injuries and the fact that the Parris relative --

THE COURT: She gives an explanation, and I am looking at the document. "Because there was evidence of old healed injuries that occurred before the adoption we didn't think that the issue raised in Detective Breen's letter regarding past sexual and physical abuse of the child and his report, that there was evidence of healed injuries that were possibly several years old was

1 reportable to the ministry." 2 She doesn't say anything about the new 3 injuries. 4 MR. SEARBY: But she attaches the 5 detective's report to it. I don't have in front of me 6 what the Court is reading from, but I am not disagreeing 7 with you. I just believe that that communication also 8 forwarded the report. 9 THE COURT: And then, she goes on to say 10 "immediately upon learning of the August 2016 11 hospitalization, I telephoned my representative in 12 Poland, and a report was made about the possible injury 13 and abuse in Polish foster care." 14 So she is deflecting them from appreciating 15 that the rape and the terrible injuries to this child 16 occurred in Texas, not in Poland. 17 MR. SEARBY: I would agree with the Court, 18 she is placing emphasis on the old injuries, but -- I 19 mean, the detective's report talks about both, but 20 obviously, new injuries were significant and could have 21 only occurred in Texas, and we agree with the Court on 22 that. 23 THE COURT: When did she have the nurse's 24 notes? 25 MR. SEARBY: Your Honor, I am not certain of

1	the exact date or that she did, in fact, have the nurse's
2	notes. What I believe she had was detective Bearden's
3	report, but I am not certain on that question.
4	THE COURT: Do you remember the nurse's
5	notes what document that was?
6	MS. RICE: Your Honor, there was a news
7	article that detailed the substance of the assault and
8	the abuse dated October 2016.
9	THE COURT: Yeah. And she had gotten that
10	from the person, her representative in Poland, right?
11	MS. RICE: Correct, your Honor.
12	THE COURT: Do you know if she ever got the
13	nurse's examination notes?
14	MS. RICE: Your Honor, we don't know if she
15	got the actual notes, but the article includes the
16	medical information, and your Honor, also Government's
17	Sentencing Exhibit C, the August 2016 COA report,
18	Margaret Cole writes, "this incident appears to have
19	occurred in Poland."
20	MR. SEARBY: I apologize, your Honor. I was
21	verifying that my client did not have the nurse's notes.
22	THE COURT: Okay.
23	MR. SEARBY: But I don't think she needed
24	the nurse's notes. I think the detective's report said
25	it all.

But there were two issues here: The major issue was, I think the Government and Poland would want to know that one of its children was grievously harmed.

The other issue was the extent to what the detective said, not simply my client, that there was prior injuries.

I think there was an ethical duty to report that, and that was reported to Poland in August, but reporting the old injuries doesn't in any way excuse or deny the new ones. It can't logically, if you study, the nature of the injuries.

Your Honor, if I could, I would like to address the fact that Ms. Cole's involvement in this event was not for personal profit. She was involved because she was asked to help.

The Government has suggested that it was a profit motive to deflect blame in order to protect the Poland program because it was such a significant part of the business.

THE COURT: Let me take you back to her letter to the Polish authorities. She begins on page 5 "we would like to briefly address the situation with the child in Denton, Texas. Unfortunately, this past August, after they adopted the child, the child was injured under circumstances that seemed to implicate the father.

However, at this point, he has not been formally charged with a crime and may very well be innocent of all criminal acts.

"He has a clean criminal record and has no

"He has a clean criminal record and has no history of violence, has passed a polygraph test regarding the injuries, and there doesn't seem to be conclusive evidence even that a crime has been committed."

At a time when this child was using some kind of colostomy bag.

MR. SEARBY: That's correct, your Honor.

The emphasis given that the individual may be innocent,
the individual went to trial later. He was convicted.

There was a defense in the case.

So your Honor, we are not here -- we are here before the Court because there were disclosures that were made. Obviously, if we could go back in time, obviously, Ms. Cole would have made those disclosures.

We are not here to defend what she has done but to accept responsibility. We are here to say these events around this adoption were an aberration and a life well lived in helping other people.

THE COURT: The Government makes an argument that she engaged in this conduct basically because the business was failing, and she was extremely concerned

1 that if she got kicked out of Poland by failing to 2 complete an adoption that she wouldn't be able to keep 3 the business going. 4 Is there some support for that argument in 5 the -6 MR. SEARBY: Your Honor --7 I was going to point you to THE COURT: 8 paragraph 89 of the presentence report. 9 MR. SEARBY: Your Honor, what we would say 10 is the following: 11 If you had heard from our third individual, 12 Mr. Benderson, I think what he wanted to talk about with 13 the Court were the strong reasons why he came to believe 14 after offering money to Ms. Cole to build the EAC, he 15 came to believe that her primary motive was not 16 financial; it was the pride in building this agency. 17 So clearly, she was trying to deflect blame 18 as the Court points out as to the disclosures that put 19 her before this Court for sentencing today, but I think 20 the argument from the Government that it was purely a 21 financial motive is simply putting the worst spin on it 22 possible. I think the reality, if you looked at the 23 state of her business, she personally did not profit from 24 her business in the final years.

THE COURT: We have 2016.

I am looking at

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paragraph 89, which you are correct, it looks like after 2016 looks like she has lost money every year except for 2020.

MR. SEARBY: She did, your Honor, and she took -- I believe the number is \$300,000 from an inheritance and put it in EAC to keep it going. The reason she did that is summed up in the one picture in our sentencing memo that shows -- in that picture, it is more like hundreds -- it would come back to Strongsville every year in appreciation and celebration of adopting their children, and she wanted to keep it going.

The reality is the Poland program, contrary to the Government's chart, was a small percentage at that point of the fees that they were going to get. And as I understand it from my client, that China and India programs after the Russia programs closed because Russia stopped doing international adoptions, not because of any issue involving EAC but the China and India programs dwarfed the Poland program. So I don't believe my client's motive was trying to get rich.

In any event, she comes before this Court at the age of 74 with no prior Criminal History. She lived 70 years of her life without committing an offense for which she was convicted, and as federal courts recognized, that says something.

She lived a law-abiding life until this event, and again, she helped so many people. One of the letters that really resonated with me was the letter written by Mr. Mack's daughter, who is now a captain and adopted from Eastern Europe and a captain in the United States Army stationed as I understand in Korea pursuing a Masters. She wrote that letter from Korea on her own initiative to emphasize to the Court where would she be but for my client's interests on her behalf.

So I think the law is clear that you sentence the whole individual, not simply the crime.

THE COURT: So the Sentencing Guidelines, do those emphasize the nature of the offense, overemphasizing the background of the offender?

MR. SEARBY: Your Honor, the question, it was a question the Court put to the Government in some sense, that fraud Guideline puts us in a place that overemphasizes --

THE COURT: What I am inartfully or clumsily going at, doesn't federal sentencing follow Kahn's argument that you punish the crime more so than the offender and does not follow the Benthem argument that punishment should be more forward looking?

MR. SEARBY: Your Honor, I believe with the 3553 factors with the Supreme Court's decision in Booker,

we reached a point -- and this Court has substantial discretion to decide where this goes, in my day, the Sentencing Guidelines were pretty much where it began and ended, my days with the Government.

But no, I believe we should sentence the whole individual. We have in this country a problem of overincarceration. Millions of Americans are behind bars. And I think the Court mentioned 28 U.S.C. 944.

Yes, that statute may have been a directive from Congress to the Sentencing Commission, not to the courts, but it was a recognition on the part of Congress that imposing a sentence of no imprisonment is generally appropriate where you have an individual that comes before the Court with no prior Criminal History, particularly where it is an individual like Ms. Cole who poses no threat to society going forward.

I believe that this Court can fashion a just punishment through various means at the Court's disposal that is a better use of resources and doesn't warehouse another individual behind the bars in the United States who doesn't need to be there.

As we have talked about, I think her health issues are significant. I think she needs ongoing medical care. Yes, the federal prison system, I believe it is Butner, but I may have remembered that wrong, has a

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medical facility, but I have also had clients and cooperating witnesses and other individuals over my career that have gone there, and it is not the medical care we would want with an individual who actually has two tumors in her brain, hypertension.

The tumors aren't malignant, but she needs to be followed to make sure that doesn't change. suffers from vertigo, suffers from post traumatic stress disorder, and due to hypertension and her age, she is vulnerable to COVID.

Yes, we have vaccines, but as this Court knows, vaccines give us protection, but they are not fool proof. We all know people who have had every vaccine they could get, who had become very sick from COVID, and behind bars it is very hard to isolate yourself from other inmates and to protect yourself from infection.

So based on all those factors, we would ask the Court to fashion an alternative sentence and vary below the Guidelines.

And a reference was made to the fact that Ms. Longoria received a year and a day. Well, Ms. Longoria, the starting point for her sentence was a level 19. Ms. Cole is at a level 14.

I disagree with the Government when they say Ms. Cole is more culpable than Ms. Longoria.

believe that that's true. I think that Ms. Longoria and Ms. Moran had the direct involvement in the program in Africa. The individual that spoke to the Court today was talking about Africa. Ms. Cole during this stage was withdrawing from day-to-day management.

And the Government had the opportunity and certainly the will to charge Ms. Cole with the conduct in Africa as they did these other defendants, and they didn't do it. They had years to make the case and even able to avoid the privilege and read Ms. Cole's communications with her lawyers, and still they did not charge her.

In fact, they agreed in the plea agreement not to bring further charges. And as I look at the conduct here, setting aside the event which happened, which was not foreseeable to Ms. Cole, was not -- she was not the proximate cause of the harm to the child and however horrible, she was not the one responsible for it.

The conduct to me that is most troubling are the allegations in relation to Africa, and I will end what Poland clients said about her because I think she said it well. She said, you know, Ms. Cole was a good person who tried to help her but was a poor manager of people.

THE COURT: Thank you. Is there anything

you want to say, Ma'am?

THE DEFENDANT: Okay. Thank you, your Honor, for allowing me to try to explain some of these and why it would never happen in the future.

I would like to start with one Mother's Day weekend was as horrible as a mother could have. I woke up to the fact that my baby daughter died in her sleep; SIDS. Baby Alicia's death was the birth of the EAC. My passion and goal was to save the lives of children.

This grew to 8,000 orphans celebrating
Christmas with their family. I made mistakes wrongfully
helping this Poland family.

At the time -- and they keep talking about 48 hours -- at the time, there was no law that said you have to do within a certain period. How in 2020 there was a proposed law -- I think the lawyer talked to you about it -- and now nobody, including myself, would have been able to do or would want to do what I did, and that was the help the lady who asked me for help.

The rule is now 24 hours. After you suspect a disruption you report it, central authority, country of original. So if that law would have been there in those days, you know, I wouldn't be here. So anyway, the procedures are different. As far as that medical report, I know I am not supposed to talk about it, but I just

sent that medical report over, the Denton medical report over to Poland immediately about total worry about kids being raped in Poland as this little girl was kept in the cage and raped according to the report and according to her own testimony, to somebody here.

So therefore, the idea I was hiding it from the Government, I was not hiding. I was reporting to try to get help for the kids over there. Okay?

So I am sorry about that I didn't get the words right. I was short on staff. She was right about the management. All right.

Now, I am very — although I made these serious mistakes in Poland, I am really very sorry for what happened, but look at the good I did. I worked 24 years as hard as I could work to save as many orphans as possible with my little Alicia angel with me. These children were the joy of my life. My mom worked with the agency, too, and we called them "our kids."

We enjoyed those picnics, and we had a little sign that said, "have you saved the life of a child today?"

That was a plaque on my wall. Seeing these children and opening the Holiday cards was an event that nobody ever gets in a job. It was a wonderful job. I did not do this for financial gain, except I got a

paycheck, but as the lawyer already explained, my last four years, I basically was a volunteer because my paycheck was about the same as the \$300,000 that I donated. I donated that because Russia closed, and we needed a boost.

We were working on this India program, which was huge and wonderful. Many young children needed homes, and we recently got a license, so I spent most of my time on that and stepped away from the other and had hired Debra Parris who was a great worker for another agency for 20 years, totally qualified to do the job according to Gladney & Associates. And she also had experience in Africa and domestic adoptions, so I considered it a find because I would not have to worry about that.

Your Honor, I have been in community confinement since August of 2020. I live in the country with my Amish neighbors. I eat in restaurants maybe three times a year. I don't go to malls or crowded places. I am vaccinated for COVID, but I am very afraid that I am not resistant to getting diseases at my age. I have been getting sick and my daughter who is a hospice nurse has taken me to the hospital twice, November and February for things, and then they start scanning my brain and giving me things. So this has been hard on me

because of all these problems.

So I beg you to please consider a sentence of some kind of probation or home confinement or whatever is possible as punishment for this case, so I can help my family. My son needs help. We recently planted a garden. He is diabetic and special needs. You know, you read in the report and the other thing. And so we want to spend time together and hopefully working on improving my health and his.

So I would like to put this financially and physically devastating last five years behind me. I loved the 24 years before that, and I feel very blessed to have had the opportunity to save 8,000 children. Every time I think about it, I smile. You have to smile when you think about those children that you saw at the picnics.

So again, I am very sorry for all the harm I caused and by my mistakes I made. And this is not a situation that would ever happen again.

As the EAC is closed and no other adoption agency would make that mistake because of the new laws.

Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: I have set the offense level and the Criminal History Category. I also consider the 3553 factors. First among those is the nature and

circumstances of the offense. The Defendant founded and ran an adoption consulting agency, which was based in the Northern District of Ohio, but it conducted international adoptions, especially those involving Poland and Uganda during the relevant time periods.

The background of the offense was that the Defendant was involved with making false statements and facilitating false statements to the Polish adopting agencies and United States controlling agencies.

The Defendant attempted to cover up the transfer of a child that was brought from Poland and then suffered sexual abuse at the hands of somebody the child should never have been placed with.

The location that the child was transferred had never undergone a home inspection, and the Defendant skirted over this and misrepresented that the child was going to be housed in Utah.

I also consider the Defendant's history and characteristics. She is 74 years of age, Criminal History Category I. She doesn't have any past scorable criminal record. She also does not appear to have any prior arrests. Those factors work to her benefit.

She also had operated this agency for a large number of years with some success, both to herself but perhaps more importantly for the number of adoptions

that she assisted facilitating. This was a business, and she made significant amounts of money and charged significant amounts of money to clients.

So in many ways. It was certainly not a charitable endeavor, but she nonetheless facilitated a large number of adoptions that were of significant benefit to the adopted children and to the families that received these adoptions.

She has a number of significant medical conditions that make her at some risk for adverse medical issues. She also has some psychological issues, but most of those seem tied to this case; no issue of substance abuse. She has a bachelor of science degree.

I also consider the need for the sentence to reflect just punishment, afford adequate deterrence, protect the public, and reflect the seriousness of the offense relative.

Relative to deterrence I don't think there is an issue of specific deterrence. I think there is only a marginal issue of general deterrence. I don't think the sentence I give in this case will have a significant deterrent effect one way or the other.

I do focus though, there is a need to impose just punishment. And part of that is retribution for the harm that was visited upon this poor child by the

Defendant's conduct, which would have, if the Defendant had not engaged in this conduct, it is unlikely that the child would have suffered the problems that the child has had.

I also need to consider the issue of disparities, and I have given earlier -- recorded the number of people incarcerated. The broad majority were sentenced to a period of incarcerations, and the average was somewhere in the range of 11 to 12 months.

So having considered all these factors, I am going to sentence the Defendant to three months of incarceration. I am going to then put the Defendant on three years of supervised release.

As one of the conditions of the supervised release, I am going to require for the 12 months following her release from incarceration, I am going to require that the Defendant be subject to home confinement.

She will be permitted to leave her home during those 12 months, only to attend medical treatment, attend religious services, or if she has gotten prior approval from the supervising probation officer.

I will impose a fine of \$7,500, which would be payable immediately. There will also be the imposition of \$200 special assessment. Relative to the

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fine, she will be required to pay that immediately.

If not paid immediately, she will be required to make payments of not less than 10 percent of her gross monthly income. While she is under supervised release, she is not to violate any other state, federal, or local law. She will be subject to the standard conditions, but she will, given her background, I won't require that she provide the drug screening that is typically required of offenders.

So that would be the sentence of the Court. Does the United States have any objection? MS. RICE: Your Honor, we do object to the sentence, and at this time, we also would move to dismiss Count 12 pursuant to the plea agreement.

THE COURT: I will grant the Government's motion to dismiss that count.

Does the defense have any objection? MR. SEARBY: No objection other than those already stated in regards to the enhancements, your Honor, and I apologize if things had changed. Does the Court have the opportunity to recommend designation to a --

THE COURT: I can recommend, but it is not controlling.

MR. SEARBY: And could we have the

1 opportunity to voluntarily report so she can deal with 2 her medical issues? 3 THE COURT: Well, her medical background 4 would be part of the PSR that the Bureau of Prisons would 5 consider, and presumptively, they would take that into 6 consideration relative to designating her. I am not sure 7 if Butner takes female prisoners, and the other likely 8 one -- but I will ask the Bureau of Prisons to take her 9 health conditions into consideration in making a 10 designation. 11 Thank you, your Honor. MR. SEARBY: 12 THE COURT: Does the Government have any 13 objection to allowing her to self-report? 14 MS. RICE: No, your Honor. 15 THE COURT: Okay. The way this will work, 16 the Bureau of Prisons will give you a designation, a time 17 and a place to report. You need to follow whatever 18 direction they give you as to what federal correctional 19 facilities to report to and what date to do the 20 reporting. 21 Okay. Unless there is something else, we 22 will adjourn. So thank you. 23 (Hearing concluded at 12:21 p.m.) 24

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CERTIFICATE

I, George J. Staiduhar, Official Court Reporter in and for the United States District Court, for the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript of the proceedings herein.

> s/George J. Staiduhar George J. Staiduhar, Official Court Reporter

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